Abstract: Most Internet worms use random scanning. The distribution of vulnerable hosts on the Internet, however, is highly non-uniform over the IP-address space. This implies that random scanning wastes many scans on invulnerable addresses, and more virulent scanning schemes may take advantage of the non-uniformity of a vulnerablehost distribution. Questions then arise as to how attackers may exploit such information and how virulent the resulting worm may be. These issues provide "worst-case scenarios" for defenders and "best-case scenarios" for attackers when the vulnerable-host distribution is available. This work develops such a scenario, called importance scanning, which results from importance sampling in statistics. Importance scanning scans the IP-address space according to an empirical distribution of vulnerable hosts. An analytical model is developed to relate the infection rate of worms with the importancescanning strategies. Based on parameters chosen from Witty and Code Red worms, the experimental results show that an importance-scanning worm can spread much faster than either a random-scanning worm or a routing worm. In addition, a gametheoretical approach suggests that the best strategy for defenders is to scatter applications uniformly in the entire IP-address space.
Introduction
As the number of computers and communication networks increases, Internet worms have become increasingly prevalent [8, 9, 12] . Using malicious, selfpropagating codes, worms spread rapidly by infecting computer systems and disseminating themselves in an automated fashion using the infected nodes.
Most worms employ random scanning to select target IP addresses. Since the density of vulnerable hosts is low, a random scan hits a vulnerable machine with a small probability. For example, the Code Red worm infected a vulnerable population of 360,000 machines among 2 32 IP addresses [19] . Thus, the probability that a random scan will hit a vulnerable target is only 360,000 2 32 = 8.38 × 10 −5 . Therefore, random scanning wastes many scans on invulnerable addresses.
Future worms, however, are likely to employ more effective scanning strategies to identify their targets. Hence, it is important that advanced scanning strategies that can potentially be used to access worst-case scenarios be studied. This work proposes such an optimal scanning method referred to as importance scanning. Importance scanning is inspired by importance sampling in statistics [17, 6, 13] . The basic idea of importance sampling is to make rare events occur more frequently and thus reduce the number of samples needed for accurately estimating the corresponding probability. Rare events for worm scanning correspond to hitting a target in a large population. Thus, importance scanning allows attackers to focus on the most relevant parts of an address space so that the probability of hitting vulnerable hosts increases.
Importance scanning relies on a certain statistic of an underlying vulnerable-host distribution. An attacker can potentially obtain such information by querying a database of parties to the vulnerable protocol, stealthy scanning the (partial) target address space, and/or searching the records of old worms [14] .
In view of the amount of information an attacker can obtain, random, flash [15] , and routing [20] worms can be regarded as special cases of importance-scanning worms. In particular, a random worm has no information about the vulnerable-host distribution and thus regards the distribution as uniform in the IPv4 space. A flash worm acquires all knowledge, and the target distribution is uniform only in the vulnerable-population space. A routing worm has the knowledge from BGP routing tables about the space of existing hosts, and the corresponding distribution can be considered as uniform in the routing space.
In this work, we assume that a probability distribution of vulnerable hosts is available/obtainable. We then intend to answer the following questions:
• How can an attacker design a fast importancescanning worm by taking advantage of the knowledge of the vulnerable-host distribution?
• How can we quantitatively analyze the relationship between the speed that worms can achieve and the knowledge that attackers can obtain?
• How can a defender counteract such importancescanning worms?
To answer these questions, we focus on two quantities: the infection rate that characterizes how fast worms can spread at an early stage and the scanning strategy that is used to locate vulnerable hosts. We first derive relationships between the infection rate and scanning strategies. We then model the spread of importance-scanning worms using the analytical active worm propagation (AAWP) model [1] . We derive the optimal scanning strategy that maximizes the infection rate. That is, the optimal strategy corresponds to the best-case scenario for attackers and the worst-case scenario for defenders. As the optimal strategy is difficult to achieve in reality, we derive a suboptimal scanning strategy as an approximation.
To assess the virulence, we compare importance scanning with random and routable scanning. We take the empirical distributions of Witty-worm victims and Web servers as examples of the vulnerable-host distribution. We show that an importance-scanning worm based on parameters chosen from real measurements can spread nearly twice as fast as a routing worm before the victim population becomes saturated. Moreover, we demonstrate, from the viewpoint of game theory, that a defense mechanism against importance-scanning worms requires the uniform distribution of an application. Under this defense strategy, the best strategy of importance scanning is equivalent to the random-scanning strategy.
Our designed importance scanning is inspired by importance sampling [17, 6, 13] . Our work, however, is different from [17] in that [17] is on estimating the density of Web servers, and we focus on optimal scanning worms that use an uneven vulnerable-host distribution. Hence, while [17] studies a static quantity as the density of Web servers, we consider a dynamic process as the worm propagation. Moreover, [17] uses the variance of an estimator as the performance indicator, and we employ the worm propagation speed, such as the infection rate, as the objective function.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the background on worm-scanning methods, vulnerable-host distributions, and a random worm propagation model. Section 3 describes the problem. Section 4 characterizes the importancescanning strategy through the theoretical analysis. Section 5 shows the propagation speed of importancescanning worms empirically. Section 6 further discusses the defense strategy and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries

Scanning Methods
A worm spreads by employing distinct scanning mechanisms such as random, localized, and topological scanning [14] . Random scanning, used by such infamous worms as Code Red and Slammer, selects target IP addresses at random. Localized scanning, used by the Code Red II and Nimda worms, preferentially scans for hosts in the "local" address space. Topological scanning, used by the Morris worm, relies on the "address" information contained in the victim machines to locate new targets.
Some advanced scanning methods have been developed in the research community. For example, Staniford et al. presented the "hitlist" idea [14] to speed up the spread of worms at the initial stage. This list consists of potentially vulnerable machines that are gathered beforehand and targeted first when the worm is released. An extreme case for the hitlist-scanning worms is a flash worm, which gathers all vulnerable machines into the list. The flash worms are considered the fastest possible worms [15] , for every scan can hit a vulnerable host. Another method that improves the spread of worms is to reduce the scanning space. Attackers can potentially achieve this by using the information provided by BGP routing tables. This type of worm is called a "routable-scanning worm" [16] or a "routing worm" [20] . Zou et al. designed two types of routing worms [20] . One type, based on Class-A (x.0.0.0/8) address allocations, is thus called "Class-A routing worms." Such worms can reduce the scanning space to 45.3% of the entire IPv4 address space. The other type, based on BGP routing tables, is thus called "BGP routing worms." Such worms can reduce the scanning space to only about 28.6% of the entire IPv4 address space. Another strategy that a worm can potentially employ is DNS random scanning [5] , in which a worm uses the DNS infrastructure to locate likely targets by guessing DNS names instead of IP addresses. Such a worm in the IPv6 Internet is shown to exhibit a propagation speed comparable to that of an IPv4 random-scanning worm.
Most of these advanced worms can propagate far faster than a traditional random-scanning worm. When these advanced worms are studied, however, the vulnerable hosts are assumed to be uniformly distributed in either the entire IPv4 address space or the scanning space. Hence, the information on a vulnerable-host distribution is not exploited by the worms.
Vulnerable-Host Distributions
The distribution of vulnerable hosts in the Internet is not uniform. This is evident as no hosts can exist in reserved or multicast IPv4 address ranges assigned by the Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) [23, 18] . More importantly, the vulnerablehost distribution may be highly non-uniform over the registered IPv4 address space as indicated by our two collected traces. One trace is a traffic log of the Witty worm obtained from CAIDA [24] . The Witty worm attacks ISS firewall products and carries a destructive payload [12] . CAIDA used a Network Telescope to record packets from victims of the Witty worm. Since the network telescope approximately contains the addresses of a Class-A subnet, the collected trace can accurately reflect the distribution of hosts that are vulnerable to the Witty worm [12] . The collected victim addresses are then used to estimate the probability distribution of Witty-worm victims in group i, where p g (i) = number of addresses in group i total number of collected addresses .
The /8 subnet empirical distribution of Witty-worm victims is shown in Figure 1 (a). The other trace is on Web servers. We collected 13,866 IP addresses It is observed that the distributions of both Wittyworm victims and Web servers are far from uniform in the routable address space. A statistical analysis of network telescope observations also shows that the victims of Code Red and Slammer worms have a highly non-uniform geographical distribution [8, 9] . Moreover, DShield [22] data indicate that the distributions of vulnerable hosts among prefixes follow a power law [11] .
Random Worm Propagation Model
We now review a worm propagation model as preparation for relating the rate of worm spread with the distribution of vulnerable hosts. A simple model, known as the susceptible → infected (SI) model, has been used to model the spread of random-scanning worms in various earlier works [14, 20, 5] . The model assumes that each host has only two states: susceptible or infected. Once infected, a host remains infected.
As importance scanning (sampling) is usually performed in discrete time [17] , we adopt a discrete-time SI model. In particular, we use the analytical active worm propagation (AAWP) model, developed by Chen et al. in [1] . In the AAWP model, the spread of random-scanning worms is characterized as follows:
where I t is the number of infected hosts at time t (t ≥ 0); N is the number of vulnerable hosts; s is the scanning rate of the worm; and Ω is the scanning space. At t = 0, I 0 represents the number of hosts on the hitlist. When a worm begins to spread, I t << N and sI t << Ω. The AAWP model can be approximated by
where α = sN Ω is the infection rate [20] . The infection rate represents the average number of vulnerable hosts that can be infected per unit time by one infected host during the early stage of worm propagation. Based on Equation (3), I t ≈ (1 + α) t I 0 , i.e., the number of infected hosts increases exponentially. Therefore, to speed up the spread of worms at the early stage, attackers should design effective scanning methods to increase the infection rate. For instance, a traditional random worm scans the entire IPv4 address space, and thus Ω = 2 32 . The infection rate of this worm is α 0 = sN 2 32 . In contrast, a BGP and a Class-A routing worm can achieve faster infection rates with the same scanning rate and the same number of targets [20] : α 1 = sN 0.286×2 32 = 3.5α 0 and α 2 = sN 0.453×2 32 = 2.2α 0 .
Problem Description
We now describe the problems studied in this paper. Let s be the scanning rate or the number of scans that an infected host sends per unit time. Define A n (1 ≤ n ≤ s) as an IPv4 address probed by the nth scan from an infected host at the early stage of worm propagation. Thus, A n is a random variable, and A n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2 32 }. Let I(A n ) denote the vulnerability of address A n , I(A n ) = 1, if address A n is vulnerable to a worm; 0, otherwise.
Thus, An I(A n ) = N . Let p(A n ) denote the actual vulnerable-host distribution, i.e., the probability that
Let p * (A n ) denote the probability that the worm scans address A n . p * (A n ) can be a uniform distribution as in random-scanning worms or a non-uniform biasing distribution as in flash worms. p * (A n ) is chosen by an attacker. The choice of the scanning distribution p * (A n ) is essential to the effectiveness of importance scanning. As we shall see, p * (A n ) depends on the actual probability distribution p(A n ).
In this paper, we intend to answer the following questions:
• Given complete knowledge about p(A n ), what is the optimal choice of p * (A n ) that maximizes infection rate α?
• Given partial knowledge about p(A n ), what is the optimal choice of p * (A n ) that maximizes α?
• What are the spread dynamics of importancescanning worms using the optimal or the practical choice of p * (A n )?
• How much faster can an importance-scanning worm spread than a random or a routing worm?
• How can we defend against such importancescanning worms by customizing p(A n )? Table 1 shows the notations used in this paper.
Importance Scanning
We begin by answering the first three of these five questions in this section. This suffices to deriving the infection rate of importance-scanning worms and modeling the spread of importance-scanning worms. Vulnerable-host density:
Infection Rate
Let R be the number of hosts that can be infected per unit time by one infected host during the early stage of worm propagation. R can be expressed as
where we assume that different scans do not hit the same target at the early stage of worm propagation, i.e., if i = j, then A i = A j . Therefore, the infection rate is given by
where E * [·] denotes the expectation with respect to the scanning distribution p * (A n ). It is noted that
for any p * (A n ).
Hence, the infection rate is strongly influenced by the choice of scanning distribution p * (A n ). A choice of p * (A n ) determines a scanning strategy, and a good choice, in the view of an attacker, should maximize infection rate α. Two special cases have been observed on "choosing" p * (A n ). The first case is the randomscanning worms, in which p * (A n ) = 1 2 32 . Thus, α = sN 2 32 = α 0 . The second case is the flash worms, in which p * (A n ) = p(A n ). In this case, p * (A n ) obtains the optimal scanning strategy p * opt (A n ), which leads to max p * (A n ) {α} = s, indicating that every scan from the worm would hit a vulnerable host.
One interpretation of p * opt (A n ) suggests that a good worm scanning strategy should concentrate the scans on the areas that are more likely to find a vulnerable host. The vulnerable-host probability distribution p(A n ), however, cannot be obtained without probing the entire IP address space or gathering a complete database of parties to the vulnerable protocol. Therefore, attackers may not acquire the entire knowledge of p(A n ). However, partial knowledge can be obtained, e.g., by aggregating the subspaces of IP addresses.
Group Distributions
Such partial information is referred to as group distributions, which capture the statistics of groups of addresses rather than individual addresses. The vulnerable-host probability distribution in groups is essentially the marginal of the actual distribution p(A n ). Such groups of addresses can be formed in several ways. For example, IP addresses can be grouped by using the conventional 4-byte description. In [17] , this approach is applied to measure the size of the Internet via importance sampling. Here, we extract relevant groups in a more general setting by defining the networks. In particular, we regard a network as a group of IP addresses that can be identified by such diverse methods as either the first byte of IP addresses (/8 subnets) or IP prefixes in CIDR.
We assume that the Internet is partitioned into m networks. Let D i (i = 1, 2, · · · , m) denote the partition set of addresses in network i, which has Ω i (Ω i ≥ 0) addresses. Thus,
as the proportion of vulnerable hosts in network i, i.e.,
where N i is the population of vulnerable hosts in network i. The partition of networks reflects the knowledge that attackers can obtain. For example, in one extreme case of random-scanning worms, m = 1 and Ω 1 = 2 32 . In the other extreme case of flash worms, m = 2 32 and Ω i = 1 (i = 1, 2, · · · , 2 32 ). Another choice of partitioning networks is based on the first byte of IP addresses (/8 subnets), where m = 2 8 and Ω i = 2 24 (i = 1, 2, · · · , 2 8 ). The amount of knowledge collected by the worm with the /8 subnet distribution is only partial, somewhere between that by the random worm and that by the flash worm.
Recall that the goal of importance scanning is to maximize the infection rate. From Equation (9), we have the infection rate
Refer to the location of an address A n , which is in network i, as the interface denoted by b (b = 0, 1, · · · , Ω i − 1). Let p i (b) denote the actual probability of finding a vulnerable host with the interface equal to b, given that the host is in network i, i.e.,
. Similarly, define group scanning distribution p * g (i) as the probability of scanning network i and interface scanning distribution p * i (b) as the probability of scanning interface b, given that a scan hits network i for the scanning distribution p * (A n ). We can obtain
where A n is in network i with interface b. From Equations (13) and (14), the infection rate becomes
= sN
We assume that attackers can obtain information only about group distribution p g (i) and cannot acquire further knowledge about interface distribution p i (b). Therefore, if a scan hits network i, the Ω i hosts in this network are targeted by that scan with the same like-
. Hence, Equation (16) yields
Equation (17) provides the relationships among the infection rate, the group distribution, and the group scanning distribution.
, referred to as the vulnerable-host density in group i, then
The equality holds when p * g (j) = 1, j = arg max k {v k }; or 0, otherwise. This means that the optimal importance scanning of a worm is to scan only the network with the largest vulnerable-host density.
Importance-Scanning Worm Propagation Model
We now model the spread dynamics of importancescanning worms based on the information of a group distribution.
At time t (t ≥ 0), let I t,i denote the average number of infected hosts in network i. Thus, the total number of infected hosts I t = m i=1 I t,i . The rate at which network i is scanned is sI t p * g (i). As an importance scanning worm employs random scanning within each network, on the next time epoch, the number of infected hosts in network i can be derived by the AAWP model, i.e., (21) where i = 1, 2, · · · , m and t ≥ 0. I 0,i is the number of initially infected hosts in network i. The above equation yields
. (22) Since
. Summing over i = 1, 2, · · · , m on both sides, we obtain
The equality holds when
When t = 0, N i >> I t,i and then
The above derivation results in an optimal importancescanning strategy that maximizes the infection rate.
Optimal importance scanning:
1. At each time step t, the worm first finds the network that has the largest value of the left vulnerable-host density, i.e., j = arg max k {
2. Then all infected hosts concentrate on scanning this network. That is, p * g (j) = 1 and p * g (i) = 0, ∀i = j.
This optimal importance scanning strategy, however, is not realistic. First, N may not be known in advance. Second, the network that has the largest value of the left vulnerable-host density changes with time, and therefore, the optimal assignment of p * g (i) is time-varying. Even when N were given, it would require that each infected host knows I t,i , which leads to numerous information exchanges between infected hosts. However, the essence of optimal importance scanning is that it provides the best scenario of worm scanning using the vulnerable-host distribution, which can be used as the baseline for a suboptimal selection of p * g (i). A simple strategy for suboptimal importance scanning is to assume p * g (i) =
That is, the probability that a worm scans network i is proportional to the vulnerable-host density of this network.
. For this scanning strategy, Equation (21) becomes
Suboptimal importance scanning:
1. Before a worm is released, an attacker first obtains vulnerable-host group distribution p g (i) and then encodes group scanning distribution
in the worm code.
2. At each time step t, the worm scans network i with probability p * g (i).
Experiments
In this section, we study the propagation speed of importance-scanning worms based on parameters chosen from the real measurements. We first introduce the experimental set-up. We then show the effect of knowledge and vulnerable-host distributions on the propagation of importance-scanning worms. Finally, we compare importance scanning with random and routable scanning.
Experimental Set-up
In our experiments, we use the model in Equation (2) to imitate the spread of random-scanning and routing worms. Meanwhile, we employ the model in Equations (21) and (24) to study propagation as a result of the optimal importance-scanning strategy. We also use the model in Equation (25) to simulate the spread of suboptimal importance-scanning worms. To implement the models in Equations (21), (24) , and (25), we need to obtain group distribution p g (i). Here, we use the Witty-worm victim and the Web-server distributions as examples of the vulnerable-host distribution. In other words, we assume that worms attack vulnerable hosts with the same group distribution as that of Witty-worm victims or Web servers. Our collected trace of Web servers does not include all Web servers. However, we assume that the estimated results obtained by Equation (1) are the actual group distribution of Web servers.
The parameters we use in simulated worms are comparable to those in Witty and Code Red worms for evaluating propagation. The Witty worm has a vulnerable population N = 12, 000 and a scanning rate s = 1, 200 per second [12, 21] . The Code Red worm has parameters N = 360, 000 and s = 358 per minute [19] . The victims of the Code Red worm is assumed to have the same group distribution as Web servers. We then refer to such an importance-scanning worm as the importancescanning (IS) Witty or Code Red. Since the experimental results of the Code Red worm are similar to those of the Witty worm, we mainly present the observations from the Witty worm.
Knowledge Effect
The amount of knowledge about a vulnerable-host distribution affects the rate of spread of importancescanning worms. Figure 2 shows the propagation comparison among suboptimal importance-scanning Witty worms with different amounts of knowledge about the vulnerable-host distribution, assuming a hitlist of 10 (i.e., I 0 = 10). If a worm has the /0 subnet distribution, it knows nothing about the distribution and thus has to use random scanning. We assume that all three Witty worms have the same scanning rate, although a worm that contains more information about the group distribution might slow down for a larger payload. It takes the Witty worm with a /0 subnet distribution 46.3 minutes to infect 90% of vulnerable hosts, whereas the Witty worms with a /8 subnet distribution and a /16 subnet distribution take only 6.6 minutes and 1.6 minutes, respectively. Therefore, more information about the vulnerable-host distribution may help an attacker design a faster worm.
Vulnerable-Host Distribution Effect
A vulnerable-host distribution also affects the rate of propagation of importance-scanning worms. Figure 3 demonstrates the spread of the suboptimal importance-scanning Witty worms using the /8 subnet distribution, in which vulnerable hosts follow different distributions, assuming a hitlist of 10 (i.e., I 0 = 10). A uniform distribution in IPv4 can slow down the worm at least six times than the Wittyworm victim distribution before the victim population becomes saturated. Therefore, the distribution of vulnerable hosts strongly affects the rate of spread of importance-scanning worms.
Propagation Comparisons
Importance scanning also helps hasten the propagation of a worm. Figure 4(a) shows how propagation as a result of importance-scanning Witty worms compares with that of random and BGP routing Witty worms, assuming a hitlist of 10 (i.e., I 0 = 10). The rate of spread of importance-scanning Witty worms increases significantly by using the information on the /8 subnet distribution of vulnerable hosts. The optimal importance-scanning Witty worm can infect 90% vulnerable hosts in as few as 4.2 minutes, whereas the BGP routing Witty worm requires 13.3 minutes. The suboptimal importance-scanning Witty worm spreads more slowly than the optimal worm, but only takes 6.6 minutes to infect the same number of hosts. A BGP routing worm obtains the refined information about the routable space than the worm using the /8 subnet distribution. The BGP routing worm, however, employs random scanning in the BGP routable space. Hence, such a worm, most of time, spreads more slowly than the importance-scanning worm with the /8 subnet distribution, which exploits the underlying uneven distribution of vulnerable hosts.
Once most of the vulnerable hosts are infected, the spread of the suboptimal importance-scanning Witty worm slows down. This is because the suboptimal strategy always uses the same group scanning distribution. As the infected hosts become saturated, a network that initially has more vulnerable hosts ac- With regard to the storage requirement for /8 subnet group-distribution information, each p g (i) requires 4 bytes, and each /8 prefix 1 byte. Therefore, the total number of bytes is 5 × 256 = 1280. We can reduce this payload by removing the entries with p g (i) = 0, where i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 255}. Since there are only 97 entries with non-zero p g (i)'s according to the empirical distribution in Figure 1(a) , the table can be stored in a 97 × 5 = 485 byte payload. Hence, the scanning rate of importance-scanning worms will not decrease much. From Theorem 2, we note that when the defender uses the optimal strategy, the best strategy that the attacker exploits is equivalent to the random-scanning strategy. Meanwhile, Figure 3 demonstrates that the vulnerable-host distribution has a strong effect on worm propagation. Therefore, the design of the future Internet should consider how to distribute an application in security engineering.
In the current Internet, however, the application distributor may not control how to deploy the application in the entire IPv4 address space. Although not applicable for the entire Internet, the best strategy of defenders can still apply for enterprise networks. That is, if an enterprise network attempts to defend against importance-scanning worms, the administrator of this network should distribute the application uniformly in the entire enterprise network from the viewpoint of game theory.
Conclusions
In order to effectively defend against Internet worms, we must study potential scanning techniques that attackers may employ. In this paper, we present an optimal worm-scanning method, called importance scanning, using the information of a vulnerable-host distribution. This scanning strategy then provide a best-case scenario for attackers when the vulnerablehost distribution is available. Importance scanning can be combined with other scanning methods such as hitlist scanning. Moreover, the division of groups can be very general, such as Domain Name System (DNS) Top-Level Domains, countries, Autonomous Systems, IP prefixes in Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR), the first byte of IP addresses (/8 subnets), or first two bytes of IP addresses (/16 subnets). For example, when naming distribution information is exploited, importance scanning can also be applied to DNS worms [5] , which is worth further investigation. In addition, when IPv4 is updated to IPv6, an importance-scanning worm will not be slowed down very much if vulnerable hosts are still distributed in a clustered fashion. A game-theoretical approach suggests that the best strategy for defenders is to distribute the applications evenly in the entire address space or in each enterprise network.
As part of our ongoing work, we are studying how an intelligent worm can learn about the underlying vulnerable-host distribution if such information is unknown before the worm is released [3] . We plan to investigate how future worms can use advanced learning algorithms to obtain information needed and how we can counteract such smart worms.
